Stephen Baister Writes.. On Animals and the Law
There is a great deal of law governing the relationship between humans and animals: law protecting endangered species, law on health and welfare in food production, law about keeping dangerous animals, and criminal law preventing the mistreatment of animals. But there are limits: you cannot leave money to an animal in your will, and an animal cannot be a party to legal proceedings, at least these days.
Everyone knows about the trial and execution of an unfortunate monkey in Hartlepool during the Napoleonic Wars, after a French ship was wrecked in a storm off the English coast. The monkey was the only survivor of the wreck of an enemy ship. It was dressed in a French army uniform.
In the US in 2015, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals sued one David Slater on behalf of a monkey named Naruto. The judge dismissed the case, ruling that the monkey did not have legal standing. An appeal failed.
In the same year but in this jurisdiction, it fell to Mr Justice Snowden to consider the capacity of an animal to bring legal proceedings: not a monkey this time, but a dog. In Moosun v HSBC Bank t/a First Direct [2015] EWHC 3308 (Ch) the claimant, Ms Moosun, brought proceedings against her bank and solicitors on behalf of herself, her minor children and her two dogs, Goldie and Diamond. Snowden J struck out Ms Mooson’s claims on the grounds that they were an abuse of process. As regards the dogs, he noted that CPR 2.3(1) defined “claimant” as a person who makes a claim. A dog could not be a person, he held.
He went on: “I also cannot see how a dog could give instructions for a claim to be brought on its behalf or be liable for any orders made against it. There are a whole host of other reasons why proceedings by dogs must be void, and accordingly I am satisfied that in so far as the claim purports to be made on behalf of the two dogs it should also be struck out.”
Manolete does not generally become involved in animal claims, but it is worth remembering that, since animals are chattels and can thus form part of an insolvency estate, they can be the subject of insolvency litigation. Norris J’s judgment in McLean & Anor v Trustees of the Bankruptcy Estate of Dent & Ors [2016] EWHC 2650 (Ch) was an application by administrators which, in the judge’s words, “affords the opportunity to consider the application of the equitable doctrines of marshalling and subrogation in relation to a fixed charge over a dog.”
So, you never know.
Stephen Baister - Board Director